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REAL PROPERTY-LliNDLORD AND TENANT-TRANSFER BY LESSEE AS SUB-

NoT AssIGNMENT-X leased lands to plaintiff for a term of years, with
a provision that if property truces were assessed against the property in excess of

LEASE,
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a certain amount, plaintiff would pay X a certain proportion of the excess amount
as additional rent. Plaintiff then transferred his remaining term to defendant
"subject to the terms" of the overlying lease. In addition, the sublease provided
for a right to cancel the sublease if defendant failed to restore in case of fire or
in the event of taking by eminent domain. Subsequent to the sublease, the tax
assessments exceeded the amount stipulated in the overlying lease. Plaintiff
sued defendant to recover the taxes as additional rent. The district court found
that defendant did not assume the payment of any excess tax and denied recovery. On appeal, held, affirmed; the transfer does not constitute an assignment of
the overlying lease, and, therefore, the sublessee is not liable on the covenants
of the overlying lease. Coles Trading Co. 11. Spiegel, Inc., (9th Cir. 1951) 187

F. (2d) 984.
The basic distinction between an assignment of a lease and a sublease seems
clear. If the original lessee (sublessor) conveys his entire term, retaining no
reversionary interest in the property, the transaction constitutes an assignment.
But, if the sublessor retains any reversionary interest, however small, the conveyance amounts to a sublease. 1 The importance of the distinction is that since
no privity exists between the original lessor and sublessee, covenants entered
into between the original lessor and original lessee, even though covenants
running with the land, cannot affect the sublessee personally. The courts are
agreed that an assignment establishes privity between lessor and sublessee,
whereas a sublease does not. 2 There is a conilict of authority, however, on the
question of what facts are necessary to establish a reversionary interest. Some
courts have adopted the position that a retention of a right of re-entry for condition broken by the lessee-sublessor is not a sufficient reversionary interest to
make the transfer an assignment. This view is founded on the argument that
a right of re-entry in a lease is a mere chose in action and not an estate in land;
hence, it cannot be a reversionary interest.3 Other courts, however, following
the so-called Massachusetts rule, take a contrary view, holding that a right of
re-entry for breach of covenant prevents the transfer by the lessee to his sublessee
from being an assignment.4 The reason usually given to support this rule is that
a right of re-entry for condition broken is an interest in land reversionary in
nature which may be transferred by deed. 11 The former view, that a right to
re-enter for breach of condition subsequent does not amount to a reversionary
l 32 AM.. JuR., Landlord and Tenant 314 (1941).
2Woon, LAW OF LANDLORD AND TEN.ANT §131 (1881). The principal case is somewhat unusual in that the sublessor sued his transferee and attempted to hold the latter to
the terms of the overlying lease by proving an assignment of the lease. More often the
original lessor, the owner, sues the sublessee for breach of covenant, often non-payment of
rent. In either case the court must decide whether a right of re-entry for condition broken,
retained by the sublessor, amounts to a reversion.
s Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129 ill. 318, 21 N.E. 920 (1889).
4 Dunlap v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161 (1881) is a leading case taking this view.
5 Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912). And see 2 PLATT, LEASBS 218
(1847).
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interest, seems to be in accord with the early common law.6 It should be noted,
however, that the common law rule was founded on certain concepts of the
feudal system which have no place in modern law. Under that system, the
tenant owed the lord a service of fealty, but a conveyance of his interest in the
land transferred this duty to the transferee enabling the lord to proceed against
the transferee directly. The retention of a right of re-entry by the transferor did
not change this result. Since these .feudal duties were attached to the land, and
as the primary duty after the transfer was on the new tenant, it was felt that
the transferor did not have a reversionary interest, despite his right of re-entry.
In view of the fact that the reason for the common law rule is no longer operative, a better approach to the problem would seem to be that implicit in the
Massachusetts rule, which resolves the question, whether the transfer is an
assignment or sublease, on the basis of the intent of the parties. If the parties'
intent clearly was to make a sublease, this intent should not be thwarted by the
court except in a case where it is impossible to find a reversionary interest "under
the logic of the law." 7 The principal case exemplifies this approach. Many
courts, however, in holding that such a transfer is a sublease and not an assignment, have placed their decisions on grounds other than that of intent.8 Nevertheless, it seems not unlikely that the intent of the parties is one of the most
important factors considered by a court, if only subjectively, in deciding whether
a transaction amounts to an assignment or a sublease; and that this is the proper
approach, under modern conditions, seems unquestionable.

John S. Slavens

6 See 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., §954 (1902); 1 TAYLOR, LANDLORD
AND TENANT, 9th ed., 356 (1904).
7 See the dissent of Finch, J., in Stewart v. Long Island R. Co., 102 N.Y. 601, 8 N.E.
200 at 213 (1886).
8 For a collection of cases see Wallace, "Assignment and Sublease,'' 8 hro. L.J. 359
at 366-374, n. 38-45 (1932).

